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SUSTAINABLE USE OF ENDANGERED SPECIES
UNDER CITES: IS IT A SUSTAINABLE ALTERNATIVE?
CATHARINE L. KRIEPS*
When God punished the world in the time of Noah, all
these wild animals were protected and put on Noah's Ark.
And it was written that no animals should be destroyed
and that you should protect wildlife in the same way you
do your domestic animals. When we realized here that
our wildlife was being destroyed, we realized we had to do
something.... [W]e decided to work out this plan, so that
it would be possible that a family could shoot some
animals to eat ... and the game would still be plentiful.
-Himba village elder, Namibia'
1. INTRODUCTION
Over twenty years have passed since the signing of the
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild
Fauna and Flora ("CITES" or "Convention"),2 which is intended
to regulate and to monitor the international trade in wildlife and
plants.3 In the intervening years, the CITES signatory nations
have achieved remarkable progress in preserving the populations
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School; B.A., 1984, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee; M.A., 1986, and
M.I.L.S., 1991, University of Michigan; J.D. Candidate, 1998, University of
Pennsylvania Law School. This Comment is dedicated to my husband, James
Newell, with many thanks for his love and encouragement. Thanks also to
Eric McCarthy, Greg Kolton, and the Journal of International Economic Law
editorial staff for their help in editing this piece.
I RAYMOND BONNER, AT THE HAND OF MAN: PERIL AND HOPE FOR
AFRIcA's WILDLIFE 23 (1993).
2 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna
and Flora, Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243 (entered into force
July 1, 1975) [hereinafter CITES].
3 See id.
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
of certain endangered species. 4
Equally significant, however, has been the precipitous decline
in the numbers of other species accorded maximum protection
under CITES.' For example, recent estimates show that Kenya,
which in 1968 had one of the world's largest rhinoceros ("rhino")
populations with 18,000 rhinos, had just over 400 rhinos left in
1992.6 This sharp decline occurred despite the rhino's CITES
Appendix I listing, which affords to endangered wildlife the
highest possible level of protection against the threat of interna-
tional trade.7 Similarly, tiger populations in Asia - also accorded
CITES Appendix I protection - have declined by as much as
ninety-five percent during the twentieth century.8 No more than
5,000 tigers remain in Asia today, and three of the eight known
tiger species are extinct. At the same time, world trade in wild
animals and plants has reached a record high - an estimated five
to ten billion dollars per year,10 approximately two to three
4 For instance, elephants are flourishing in South Africa under CITES. See
Maria Cone, Bid to Ease Ban on Elephant Products Dropped, L.A. TIMES, Nov.
16, 1994, at A21 [hereinafter Cone, Bid]. The herd currently is estimated to
number 9,000 elephants, of which approximately 350 elephants must be killed
each year to keep the population under control. See id. In Kenya, poachers
kill fewer than 50 elephants per year, as compared to the 5,000 elephants lost
annually before the CITES ivory ban was instituted in 1989. See Marla Cone,
Global Wildlife Summit Under Way, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1994, at A18. For
recent articles discussing the fate of elephants under CITES, see generally John
L. Garrison, Comment, The Convention on International Trade in Endangered
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) and the Debate over Sustainable Use, 12
PACE ENVTL. L. REv. 301 (1994); Andrew J. Heimert, Note, How the Elephant
Lost His Tusks, 104 YALE L.J. 1473 (1995); and Bill Padgett, Note, The African
Elephant, Africa, and CITES: The Next Step, 2 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 529
(1995).
1 See, e.g., Rhino Rescue?, 23 ENVTL. POL'Y & L. 15, 15 (1993) [hereinafter
Rhino].
6 See id.
7 See id. Species listed on Appendix I of CITES include all those threatened
with extinction which are or may be affected by the international trade in
wildlife. See CITES, supra note 2, 27 U.S.T. at 1092, 993 U.N.T.S. at 245.
Trade restrictions for species listed in Appendix I include a complete ban on
commercial trade. See id.; see also infra note 43 (discussing the CITES appendix
system).
t See James Gerstenzang, U.S. Will Impose Trade Sanctions Against Taiwan
to Protect Wildlife, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 12, 1994, at A7.
9 See id.
10 A number of sources estimate the world's annual trade in exotic wildlife
to be at least $5 billion. See, e.g., SARAH FITZGERALD, INTERNATIONAL
WILDLIFE TRADE: WHOSE BUSINESS IS IT? 3 (1989). Another estimate places
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billion dollars of which is now estimated to stem from illegal
exchanges." Such figures illustrate CITES' failure to fully
protect wild fauna and flora "for this and the generations to come
... against over-exploitation through international trade."
12
At present, certain parties to CITES advocate the sustainable
use of endangered species, rather than an outright ban on trade,
as a means of improving the Convention's effectiveness.13
Sustainable use is the "[u]se of an organism, ecosystem[,] or other
renewable resource at a rate within its capacity for renewal."14
Sustainable use originates in the broader concept of sustainable
development, a philosophy whose purpose is to balance conflicting
international developmental needs, or to "[meet] the needs of the
present without compromising the ability of future generations to
meet their own needs.""5 Although the terms sustainable
development and sustainable use are sometimes used interchange-
the value of worldwide wildlife trade at "more than $10 billion a year."
Kathryn S. Fuller, Foreword to INTERNATIONAL WILDLIFE TRADE: A CITES
SOURCEBOOK vii (Ginette Hemley ed., 1994) [hereinafter CITES
SOURCEBOOK].
" See Fuller, supra note 10, at vii.
12 CITES, supra note 2, 27 U.S.T. at 1090, 993 U.N.T.S. at 244. Section 2.2
of this Comment discusses briefly some of the rationales for adopting CITES.
See discussion infra section 2.2. See generally BRYAN G. NORTON, WHY
PRESERVE NATURAL VARIETY? (1987) (introducing a taxonomy of rationales
based on value concepts); STEVEN L. YAFFEE, PROHIBITIVE POLICY: IMPLE-
MENTING THE FEDERAL ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT (1982) (providing
utilitarian, ecosystem stability, and ethical arguments for promulgating
endangered species policy).
13 See Marla Cone, Conflict Marks Endangered Species Treaty, L.A. TIMES,
Nov. 20, 1994, at Al, A26 [hereinafter Cone, Conflict].
14 CARING FOR THE EARTH: A STRATEGY FOR SUSTAINABLE LIVING 211
(1991) [hereinafter CARING FOR THE EARTH]. The concept of sustainable use
also is known as sustainable utilization. Advocates of sustainable use or
utilization contend that if people or governments are allowed to trade or
otherwise use endangered species in limited amounts, then they will experience
a greater economic incentive to manage these resources in ways that more
likely will preserve the resources from extinction than if such uses were not
permitted at all. See Cone, Conflict, supra note 13, at A26.
15 WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, OUR
COMMON FUTURE 43 (1987) (consituting what is commonly known as the
Brundtland Report, named for the World Commission on the Environment and
Development's Chairperson, Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland of
Norway) [hereinafter BRUNDTLAND REPORT]. Sustainable development also
is known more generally as "sustainability." For a discussion of the difficulty
in defining sustainable development and an examination of its various
interpretations, see P.S. Elder, Sustainability, 36 MCGILL L.J. 831, 833-36 (1991).
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ably, they are not entirely synonymous. Sustainable development
implies an ongoing process of change, including changes in
existing biosystems,16 while sustainable use of renewable resourc-
es, including endangered species, points to a lack of significant
alteration of such biosystems and maintenance of existing resource
levels.17  For the sake of clarity, this Comment uses the term
sustainable use to discuss endangered species, rather than the term
sustainable development.
Environmentalists have discussed sustainable development and,
to a somewhat lesser extent, sustainable use on an international
level for nearly a quarter of a century. Since 1972, when the
notion of sustainable development first caught the world's
attention at the United Nations Conference on the Human
Environment,"8 many environmental groups have embraced this
concept as an appropriate goal for worldwide environmental
protection and developmental efforts.1 9 The concept of sustain-
16 See BRuNDTLAND REPORT, supra note 15, at 46 ("[Slustainable
development is a process of change in which the exploitation of resources, the
direction of investments, the orientation of technological development, and
institutional change are all in harmony and enhance both current and future
potential to meet human needs and aspirations."); see also Elder, supra note 15,
at 835 ("Although the intrinsic value of the biosphere is acknowledged,
[sustainable development] does not imply that all existing ecosystems must be
maintained as is.").
17 See International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural
Resources et al., WORLD CONSERVATION STRATEGY 1980, reprinted in 23
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF THE ENvIRONMENT 420, 451-53 (Bernd
Ruster et al. eds., 1981) [hereinafter WORLD CONSERVATION STRATEGY].
" See Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human
Environment, U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 48/14 (1972), reprinted in 1 INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF THE
ENVIRONMENT 118 (Bernd Ruster et al. eds., 1981) (noting that conference
participants "considered the need for a common outlook and for common
principles to ins pire and guide the peoples of the world in the preservation and
enhancement of the human environment").
19 For example, the U.N.-sponsored Brundtland Report popularized the
term "sustainable development" in 1987, as it underscored the important link
between environmental protection and economic growth. See BRUNDTLAND
REPORT, supra note 15, at 43. Agenda 21, the comprehensive action plan
adopted by the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development, further demonstrates the growing acceptance of the notion of
sustainable development because it presented a set of programs and strategies
which promote sustainable development in all countries. See generally AGENDA
21: EARTH'S ACTION PLAN (Nicholas A. Robinson ed., 1993) (including an
overview of the Agenda 21 action plan, its text, and notes about the negotiating
process).
[Vol. 17:1
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol17/iss1/15
SUSTAINABLE USE UNDER CITES
able use of renewable resources, including living species, gained
increased recognition in 1980 with the publication of the World
Conservation Strategy by the International Union for the Conser-
vation of Nature and Natural Resources ("IUCN"). 20 CITES
parties first discussed the sustainable use of endangered species at
the 1992 Conference of the Parties ("COP"),1 held in Kyoto,
Japan ("Kyoto COP").' A number of parties to CITES strongly
advocated the sustainable use concept at the most recent COP,
held in November 1994 in Fort Lauderdale, Florida ("Fort
Lauderdale COP"). At the Fort Lauderdale COP, delegations
from the United States and nearly 120 other countries debated
numerous proposals for improving CITES' effectiveness.'
The United States, despite its active involvement in CITES,24
20 See WORLD CONSERVATION STRATEGY, supra note 17, at 420. The
IUCN, which has a worldwide membership of over 450 government agencies
and conservation groups, acts as a scientific adviser to CITES members. See id.
at 423; Cone, Bid, supra note 4, at A21. This organization is currently known
as the World Conservation Union, although it has retained the original
acronym IUCN. See CYRILLE DE KLEMM, GUIDELINES FOR LEGISLATION TO
IM]?LEmENT CITES ii (1993).
2 At COPs, parties may review efforts to conserve endangered species
under CITES, may consider and adopt amendments to Appendices I and II, and
may make recommendations to improve the overal[ effectiveness of the
Convention. See DAVID S. FAVRE, INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN ENDANGERED
SPECIES: A GUIDE TO CITES 257 (1989) [hereinafter FAvRE, GUIDE TO
CITES].
2 For a brief discussion of the Kyoto COP, see David Favre, Debate
Within the CITES Community: What Direction for the Future?, 33 NAT.RESOURCES J. 875, 876 (1993) [hereinafter Favre, Debate].
2' For a discussion of the sustainable use debate, see Cone, Conflict, supra
note 13, at A26; see also United States Fish and Wildlife Service, Cooperation
Marks International Conference to Conserve World's Wild Animals and Plants
1 (Nov. 18, 1994) (press release, on file with author) (giving information on the
number of parties attending the conference). COPs are held approximately
every two and one-half years. See id. at 4. The Fort Lauderdale COP was the
ninth such session. See id. at 1.
24 The United States hosted the international conference of sovereign states
that drafted the final language of the Conference, and has been a party to
CITES since it took effect on July 1, 1975. See FAvRE, GUIDE TO CITES,
supra note 21, at xx; CITES SOURCEBOOK, supra note 10, at 122. Currently,
the United States is one of a small number of contracting parties that have
enacted specific and relatively comprehensive legislation to implement CITES.
See DE KLEMM, supra note 20, at 5. The United States enacted CITES through
the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 153143 (1988). See discussion infra
section 4.1. Additionally, as the world's foremost financial supporter of
CITES, the United States currently contributes 25% of the Convention's annual
funding - approximately $1,156,062 for the 1996-97 budget year, more than
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has neither devised a coherent approach to the idea of sustainable
use under CITES, nor formulated a coherent national policy
toward sustainable use and sustainable development.2 At the
Fort Lauderdale COP, for example, the U.S. delegation was
unable to decide on South Africa's sustainable use proposal to sell
the hides and meat from the elephants that South Africa must cull
annually and to use the proceeds to support its conservation
programs.2 6 Even after consulting with U.S. Vice President Al
Gore, the delegation could not formulate any approach to this
strongly contested issue, instead "preferring to see what other
African nations decided," rather than stating the U.S. policy on
the question.27 Such indecision not only led the U.S. delegate to
abstain from voting, thereby prompting the cancellation of the
COP's vote regarding the South African sustainable use propos-
al, 28 but it also deprived the United States of an important
opportunity to further its interests and to affect the future course
of CITES' implementation.
twice the amount contributed by Japan, the next highest contributor. See
Financing and Budgeting of the Secretariat and of Meetings of the Conference of the
Parties, in RESOLUTIONS OF THE PARTIES 19-29, Conf. 9.2 (1994) [hereinafter
Financing].
5 Recognizing the need for a coherent national policy on sustainable
development, President Bill Clinton established the President's Council on
Sustainable Development ("Council") in June 1993. See Exec. Order No.
12,852, 3 C.F.R. 611 (1994), reprinted in 3 U.S.C. § 301 (1993). The Council's
function is to advise the President on matters involving sustainable develop-
ment, to "develop and recommend ... . a national sustainable development
action strategy that will foster economic vitality," and "to review ... national
and local sustainable development plans." Id. The Council has issued its policy
recommendations on sustainable cfevelopment in a report to the President; the
White House should release this report in late February or early March 1996.
See John H. Cushman, Jr., Adversaries Back Pollution Rules Now on the Books,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 1996, at Al.
It is unlikely, however, that this domestic initiative will address the global
issue of the sustainable use of endangered species. Before the next CITES COP,
the U.S. delegation will need specific guidelines relevant to this question.
According to a recent report by the National Commission on the Environ-
ment, however, U.S. international environmental policies typically "develop on
an ad hoc basis with insufficient preparation, confused responsibilities, and a
general sense that what the rest of the world thinks or does is not very
important." NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE ENVIRONMENT, CHOOSING A
SUSTAINABLE FUTURE 7 (1993) [hereinafter CHOOSING A SUSTAINABLE
FUTURE].
26 See Cone, Bid, supra note 4, at A21.
27 Id.
28 See id.
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In light of the importance that sustainable use is likely to
assume in the future implementation of CITES,29 and the central
role that the United States plays within the Convention,3" it is
crucial that the United States develop a well-reasoned, coherent
policy on the sustainable use issue as it affects endangered species.
This Comment addresses the merits and drawbacks of the
sustainable use of endangered species under CITES, and suggests
recommendations for formulating U.S. policy in this area.31
Section 2 of this Comment discusses the structure and
functions of CITES. Section 3 examines sustainable use, its theory
and practice, and the arguments for and against the policy.
Section 4 details the existing U.S. framework for regulating trade
in endangered species. Section 5 explores the extent to which
sustainable use can be supported under the current structure.
Finally, section 6 proposes recommendations for the U.S. position
on the sustainable use of endangered species under CITES.
29 There has been a dramatic change in the emphasis placed on sustainable
use by CITES member parties. In the words of one COP participant, "[t]he
pendulum [has] swung away from [CITES] being a protectionist treaty to being
a treaty focused more on sustainable use." Report on CITES Meeting,
COMMUNIQUE (Am. Zoo & Aquarium Ass'n), Jan. 1995, at 2, 3 [hereinafter
Report].
In light of their potential benefits for the species involved, several
resolutions adopted at the Fort Lauderdale COP called for increased member
state participation in sustainable use programs. See, e.g., Conservation of Edible-
Nest Swiftlets of the Genus Collocalia, in RESOLUTIONS OF THE CONFERENCE
OF THE PARTIES 102, Conf. 9.15 (1994) (urging parties to encourage bird-nest
industry participation in sustainable use programs); Guidelines for Evaluating
Marine Turtle Ranching Proposals Submitted Pursuant to Resolution Conf 3.15,
in RESOLUTIONS OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES 124, Conf. 9.20 (1994)
("[S]ustainable use may have potential benefits for the conservation of marine
turtles and their habitats," although "the unique biology of sea turtles makes
their sustainable use difficult and imposes special restraints on their exploita-
tion, which require the application of rigorous controls.") [hereinafter, Marine
Turtle Ranching].
o See supra note 24.
31 This Comment generally excludes as beyond its scope all U.S. legislation
regarding endangered species, except the ESA, and all other treaties and
conventions affecting endangered species, including NAFTA. Other issues
arising under CITES also are excluded generally.
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2. CITES
2.1. The History of CITES
The IUCN drafted CITES in the late 1960s and early 1970s. 2
Concluded in March 1973, the Convention entered into force on
July 1, 1975."3 It has been revised periodically at the regular
COP meetings, 34 where decisions are made on numerous matters
related to CITES. 5 The Convention now has a total of 130
parties, whose common intent is to protect endangered plants and
animals from extinction by regulating international trade in
wildlife.
36
2.2. The Purpose of CITES
CITES' statements of purpose, appearing in the Convention's
preambular paragraphs, include the "protection of certain species
of wild fauna and flora against over-exploitation through interna-
tional trade."37  Given the variety of other considerations also
comprising this diverse list of purposes, it appears that no single
32 See FAvRE, GUIDE TO CITES, supra note 21, at xx.
33 See SIMON LYSTER, INTERNATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW 239-40 (1985).
' See id. at 241 (noting the four biennial and two special COPs that
occurred prior to 1985).
31 See id. at 273 (discussing the agenda at the COP meetings).
36 The most recent CITES members and the respective dates on which
CITES entered into force there include: Comoros on February 21, 1995;
Dominica on November 2, 1995; and Belarus, which became CITES' 130th
member, on November 8, 1995. See CITES Parties (as of November 8, 1995),
available in World Conservation Monitoring Centre (WCMC) Anonymous
FTP site (U.K.) (copy on file with author).
" CITES, supra note 2, 27 U.S.T. at 1090, 993 U.N.T.S. at 245.
38 The list of CITES' stated rationales reads as follows:
The Contracting States,
Recognizing that wild fauna and flora in their many beautiful and
varied forms are an irreplaceable part of the natural systems of the
earth which must be protected for this and the generations to come;
Conscious of the ever-growing value of wild fauna and flora from
aesthetic, scientific, cultural, recreational and economic points of view;
Recognizing that peoples and States are and should be the best
protectors of their own wild fauna and flora;
Recognizing, in addition, that international cooperation is essential
for the protection of certain species of wild fauna and flora against
over-exploitation through international trade;
Convinced of the urgency of taking appropriate measures to this
[Vol. 17:1
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol17/iss1/15
SUSTAINABLE USE UNDER CITES
environmental philosophy underlies CITES.39 Paragraph one of
the list reflects a preservationist rationale: to protect species for
their aesthetic value.4° Paragraphs three and four of CITES,
however, stress a conservationist principle: that people and
nations must assume an active, ongoing role in protecting and
regulating wildlife.41 Paragraph two strikes a middle ground, as
it contains a combination of both preservationist and conserva-
tionist rationales for protecting endangered species.42
CITES' implementation during its first twenty years also
suggests the philosophies underlying the Convention. The
Convention currently forbids all international commercial trade
in the approximately 675 species listed in Appendix 1.43 Manage-
ment Authorities designated by all CITES member nations permit
noncommercial trade only in those limited circumstances thought
end ....
Id. See infra section 5 for further discussion of these rationales and an
assessment of the extent to which they are compatible with the sustainable use
of endangered species.
'9 For a more thorough explanation of conservationism and
preservationism, which are the two predominant environmental philosophies,
see infra section 3.2. See also Favre, Debate, supra note 22, at 880-81 (noting
that "it is not clear whether either the 'conservationist' or an 'environmentalist'
[preservationist] could claim a dominant position within CITES," and adding
that the Convention's language was intended to allow the member parties to
possess different motivations while cooperating under the aegis of CITES).
" See CITES, supra note 2, 27 U.S.T. at 1090, 993 U.N.T.S. at 244.
41 See id.
42 See id.
43 Appendix I of CITES lists species threatened with extinction, which may
or may not be affected by trade. See FAVRE, GUIDE TO CITES, supra note 21,
at 31. According to CITES Article 11(1), trade in specimens of Appendix I
species "must be subject to particularly strict regilation in order not to
endanger further their survival and must only be authorized in exceptional
circumstances." CITES, supra note 2, 27 U.S.T. at 1092, 993 U.N.T.S. at 245.
Appendix II lists species not currently threatened with extinction, but which
could become threatened unless their trade is strictly regulated. See FAVRE,
GUIDE TO CITES, supra note 21, at 38. Appendix ImI "gives parties the option
of listing native species ... already protected within their own borders," and
was "intended to help CITES parties gain other nations' cooperation in
enforcing their own wildlife trade regulations." CITES SOURCEBOOK, supra
note 10, at 4. For a comprehensive discussion and critique of the listing system
under CITES, see FAVRE, GUIDE TO CITES, supra note 21, passim. For a
number of specific exceptions permitted under CITES, see discussion infra
section 2.4.
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not to jeopardize these protected species' chances for survival.4
This portion of CITES thus favors preservationist goals by
excluding all trade undertaken in pursuit of economic or commer-
cial gain. The 25,000 species in Appendix II of CITES, however,
may be used in commercial trade, subject to a number of
regulations. 45 In this latter case, permitting the instrumental use
of species, albeit subject to active, ongoing intervention by
Scientific and Management Authorities, 46 advances conservation-
ist goals.
Although the Convention generally strikes a balance between
preservationism and conservationism, parties occasionally favor
one philosophy over the other. In 1989, for instance, CITES
members decided to list the African elephant in Appendix I, thus
banning international commercial trade in ivory, to save elephants
from rampant ivory poaching.47 In addition, parties at the Fort
Lauderdale COP also refused to allow trade in any portion of
elephants legitimately culled from South Africa's flourishing
population.4' These controversial decisions suggest that when
the chances of survival of the protected species are unclear, the
parties will favor a preservationist interpretation of CITES.
2.3. The Functioning of CITES
CITES functions by prohibiting nearly all trade in species
threatened with extinction (those listed in Appendix I), and by
4 See CITES SOURCEBOOK, supra note 10, at 3 (noting that an acceptable
circumstance for trade might involve scientific or zoological purposes).
According to Article IX of CITES, each party must designate "one or more
Management Authorities competent to grant permits or certificates on behalf
of that Party; and ... one or more Scientific Authorities." CITES, supra note
2, 27 U.S.T. at 1103, 993 U.N.T.S. at 251; see also FAVRE, GUiDE TO CITES,
supra note 21, at 24349 (discussing the creation and duties of the Management
Authorities and Scientific Authorities). Scientific Authorities determine wheth-
er granting import and export permits is detrimental to a species, make
dei a out proposed recipients of Appendix I species, and monitor exports
and population status of Appendix II species. See id. at 248.
41 See CITES SOURCEBOOK, supra note 10, at 1-2.
46 See supra note 44. CITES defines both Scientific Authority and
Management Authority in Article IX. See CITES, supra note 2, 27 U.S.T. at
1091, 993 U.N.T.S. at 245; see also CITES SOURCEBOOK, supra note 10 at 5
(discussing the functions of Management and Scientific Authorities).
47 See CITES SOURCEBOOK, supra note 10, at 36-37.
48 See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text; see also CITES COP9: A
Recap, TRAFFIC(USA), Mar. 1995, at 15 discussing South Africa's initiation and
subsequent withdrawal of this elephant trade proposal).
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restricting commercial trade in species which might become
endangered (those listed in Appendix II) to a level that will not be
detrimental to their survival. 49  Management and Scientific
Authorities established in each CITES member country regulate
this trade through a system of permits.5°
Potential importers and exporters must meet strict conditions
before receiving permits under CITES.51 To acquire a specimen
of an Appendix I species,5 2 for example, a trader must obtain
both an export permit and an import permit. 3 To obtain an
export permit, the proper authorities in the exporting country
must determine that: (1) the export is not detrimental to the
species' survival; (2) the exporter did not obtain the specimen
illegally; (3) the trader will prepare and ship any living specimen
in a manner minimizing risk of injury or cruel treatment to the
specimen; and (4) the Management Authority in the importing
country has granted an import permit.54 For an import permit,
authorities in the importing country must determine that: (1) the
import is not detrimental to the species' survival; (2) the proposed
recipient of the living specimen is equipped to give it proper care;
and (3) the recipient of the specimen will not use it for primarily
commercial purposes.55 When trading with a nation not a party
" See CITES, supra note 2, 27 U.S.T. at 1092-95, 993 U.N.T.S. at 24547.
See also supra note 43 for a discussion of CITES' system of appendices.
" See CITES, supra note 2, 27 U.S.T. at 1103-04, 993 U.N.T.S. at 251. Not
all parties have been equally assiduous in creating the legal and institutional
structures needed to implement CITES. A recent IUCN publication noted that
fewer than 15% of CITES parties have adequate legislation for implementing
the Convention. See Francoise Burhenne-Guilmin & Izgrev Topkov, Preface
to DE KLEMM, supra note 20. The suggested causes of this problem include lack
of resources, inadequate experience, and insufficient staffing. See id.
s1 See FAvRE, GUIDE TO CITES, supra note 21, at 57.
51 For the purposes of CITES, "specimen" refers to any physical items
(including any plant or animal, whether alive or dead, anT any "readily
recognizable" parts or derivatives) that may enter into the flow of international
commerce. CITES, supra note 2, 27 U.S.T. at 1090-91, 993 U.N.T.S. at 245; see
FAVRE, GUIDE TO CITES, supra note 21, at 12-19 (analyzing the definition of
the word "specimen"). "Species" refers to any listed grouping of plants or
animals, and includes smaller groups such as subspecies or geographically
separate populations of a particular species. See CITES, supra note 2, 27 U.S.T.
at 1092, 993 U.N.T.S. at 245; see also FAVRE, GUIDE TO CITES, supra note 21,
at 12.
53 See CITES, supra note 2, 27 U.S.T. at 1093-94, 993 U.N.T.S. at 24647.
14 See id. at 1093, 993 U.N.T.S. at 246.
11 See id. at 1093-94, 993 U.N.T.S. at 246.
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to CITES, any party to the Convention may accept comparable
documentation that conforms substantially with CITES' permits.5 6
2.4. Limitations and Enforcement Problems of CITES
Notwithstanding its elaborate permit system, the implementa-
tion of CITES has given rise to numerous problems, which
frequently stem from the Convention's many exceptions. First,
the right of all parties to enter reservations with regard to any
species included in any of the Convention's appendices has caused
several difficulties." This right effectively permits unlimited
commerce in any species protected under CITES. 8 Second,
CITES parties are allowed to trade listed species with non-parties,
subject to the requirement of obtaining "comparable documenta-
tion issued by the competent authorities" in the non-member
state. 9 Third, CITES limits its scope to specimens and "readily
recognizable part[s] or derivative[s]" of protected species. 
6
Members exercise considerable discretion in determining the
recognizability of specimens discovered in trade.6" Fourth,
56 See id. at 1104, 993 U.N.T.S. at 251.
57 See id. at 1116, 993 U.N.T.S. at 257. For example, Lapan, the Soviet
Union, and Norway entered reservations regarding various whale species when
they became members of CITES between 1976 and 1980. See FITZGERALD,
supra note 10, at 338-39. This tactic allowed these nations to continue trading
in whale meat and other products without violating the Convention. See id.
at 145. Moreover, a number of non-member countries supplied them with
additional whale roducts. See id, Under a similar provision, these same three
countries entere reservations to International Whaling Commission rulings,
allowing them to continue to hunt whales legally during the 1970s and the
early 1980s. See id. at 139. Over this time period, these three nations were
responsible for over 80% of all whaling worldwide. See id.
5 See FAVRE, GuIDE TO CrrEs, supra note 21, at 323 ("The practical impact
of the taking of a reservation is that it allows the [member state] to act and
trade with the non-CITES world as if the trade restrictions did not exist.").
11 CITES, supra note 2, 27 U.S.T. at 1104, 993 U.N.T.S. at 251. The
Convention itself contains no definition for the terms "comparable documenta-
tion" or "substantially conforms," thus allowing a wide variety of interpreta-
tions among CITES members. See John B. Heppes & Eric J. McFadden, The
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and
Flora: Improving the Prospects for Preserving Our Biological Heritage, 5 B.U.
INT'L L.J. 229, 241-42 (1987) (discussing the many problems of trading with
non-parties stemming from this provision, and the advantages that countries
such as Mexico have gained by refusing to ratify CITES).
60 CITES, supra note 2, 27 U.S.T. at 1090-91, 993 U.N.T.S. at 245.
61 See Heppes & McFadden, supra note 59, at 243 (noting that the omission
of an objective standard for the term recognizable "seriously threatens the
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difficulties originate in the Convention's indefinite standards for
listing a species in the appendices.62 Fifth, potential for abuse
also stems from the exemption from regulation of specimens
found to be "personal or household effects,"63 captive-bred plants
and animals, 64 non-commercial loans between scientists or
museums, 65 and those forming part of a "travelling zoo, circus,
menagerie, plant exhibition[,] or other travelling exhibition."
66
Other problems have plagued the CITES implementation
process. Because CITES "is actually implemented at the customs
control points of each country," its provisions are effective "only
to the degree that customs officials require compliance."67 Thus,
the Convention's greatest weakness lies in relying on member
states for enforcement. When affluent member nations such as
the United States have experienced shortages in both personnel
and adequate training, it is unrealistic to expect less-developed
range states, which are countries that contain the range or habitat
for endangered species, to provide sufficient resources for
enforcement purposes. Other specific implementation problems
include the lack of strict enforcement and the inadequacy of
sanctions imposed on offenders, 69 as well as inadequate record-
keeping and the failure of many parties to file timely national
reports, if they are filed at all.70 These and other difficulties have
viability of CITES, as the bulk of international wildlife trade involves wildlife
products and derivatives").
62 See David S. Favre, Tension Points Within the Language of the CITES
Treaty, 5 B.U. INT'L L.J. 247, 249-52 (1987) (indicating the difficulties arising
from a number of undefined terms in CITES, and noting that a country's self-
interest will shape its view of how such terms should be defined in any given
circumstance) [hereinafter Favre, Tension Points].
61 CITES, supra note 2, 27 U.S.T. at 1099, 993 U.N.T.S. at 249.
61 See id. at 1100, 993 U.N.T.S. at 249.
65 See id.
6 Id. at 1101, 993 U.N.T.S. at 250.
67 Favre, Tension Points, supra note 62, at 258.
68 See Heppes & McFadden, supra note 59, at 237-40.
69 See generally Meena Alagappan, Comment, The United States' Enforcement
of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna
and Flora, 10 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 541, 550-68 (1990) (discussing the relative
weakness of sanctions imposed by member nations on CITES violators).
70 See Heppes & McFadden, supra note 59, at 233-37 (noting that "at least
45% of all CITES transactions involving animals and 79% of those involving
plants go unreported even when the transactions are between [CITES member
nations] which have submitted annual reports") (citation omitted).
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led to CITES' failure to prevent trade in endangered species in
many cases.
These problems reveal the difficulty of creating and imple-
menting an international agreement which has as its sole objective
the protection of endangered species, without taking into account
the economic and institutional demands of such actions, especially
for less affluent range states. Greater cooperation among member
states, such as that which might be achieved through a coordinat-
ed program of sustainable use, could enhance CITES' likelihood
of success.
3. SUSTAINABLE USE
3.1. The Origin of Sustainable Use
Although the notion of sustainable use of resources recently
has become more widely accepted, it is not a new concept.
Various groups have advocated this idea since at least 1980, when
the IUCN, the original sponsor of CITES in the late 1960s,
published its World Conservation Strategy."1 This document,
developed in cooperation with the United Nations Environment
Program and the World Wildlife Fund, aimed to "help advance
the achievement of sustainable development through the conserva-
tion of living resources."72 The document also identified "three
main objectives of living resource conservation" as: (1) ensuring
the sustainable utilization of species and ecosystems; (2) promoting
genetic diversity; and (3) maintaining the essential ecological
processes and the life-support systems on which human survival
and development depend.73
The World Conservation Strategy and its related documents
sparked widespread recognition among environmentalists (or
"conservationists," according to the text) of the ideas of sustainable
development and sustainable use, ultimately leading to the
71 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
72 WORLD CONSERVATION STRATEGY, supra note 17, at 424.
7' Id. at 420. In one noteworthy section of the World Conservation
Strategy, the sustainable use of resources is likened to a sound financial policy;
namely, "spending the interest while keeping the capital." Id. at 439. The
benefit of sustainable use is ensuring a society's utilization of its living resources
"virtually indefinitely." Id. More recent IUCN publications have continued
to support the concept of sustainable use. See, e.g., CARING FOR THE EARTH,
supra note 14, at 1.
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acceptance of sustainable development as an underlying principle
of the Earth Summit's Rio Declaration in June 1992.' 4 With
respect to CITES, a group of South African nations, China, and
Japan have "organized themselves into an alliance" supporting
sustainable use. 5 These parties strongly supported the concept
at both the Kyoto COP and at the Fort Lauderdale COP. Due
in part to this coalition's efforts, the sustainable use concept has
gained a growing number of supporters, and has appeared in a
number of CITES resolutions.7 6
3.2. The Theoretical Basis of Sustainable Use
Environmentalists' ready acceptance of both sustainable
development and sustainable use principles may stem from their
conformity with the existing philosophy of conservationism. Like
the notion of sustainable use, the conservationist movement
developed in response to the wasteful exploitation of resources
which threatened such resources with depletion.77 U.S. conserva-
tionists in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
advocated such ideas as "conservation through wise use, "78 and
the controlled scientific harvesting of renewable organic resources
at a rate slower than their reproduction." Their efforts were
accompanied by the increasing involvement of both scientists and
' See Favre, Debate, supra note 22, at 882 ("The Rio Declaration and its 27
principles focused on how to achieve the goal [of sustainable development], not
whether the concept ought to be a goal.").
75 Report, supra note 29, at 3.
76 See Favre, Debate, supra note 22, at 883 n.31 (quoting resolutions from
the Kyoto COP strongly in favor of sustainable use); Cone, Conflict, supra note
13, at A26 ("In last week's talks [at the Fort Lauderdale COP], it was evident
that more nations are prepared to accept the concept of 'sustainable use.'"). But
cf Fort Lauderdale: Gordon Is Gone - CITES Goes On, CITES Secretariat Press
Release, Nov. 18, 1994, at 1 (on file with author). In a press release dated
November 18, 1994, the CITES Secretariat concluded that
[flrom the debates, it is clear that the concept of sustainable utilization
is still a controversial subject, particularly between those who consider
that the only way to save wildlife is to prohibit [its] trade, and those
who think that for wildlife to survive, it must provide economic
benefits to the local human population.
Id.
' See Henry Clepper, The Conservation Movement.: Birth and Infancy, in
ORIGINS OF AMERICAN CONSERVATION 3, 3 (Henry Clepper ed., 1966).
71 Id. at 5.
79 See id.
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ordinary citizens in protecting and preserving threatened resourc-
es."0 Like their forebears, the proponents of sustainable develop-
ment and sustainable use today advocate the protection of
resources through their careful use, implying an element of human
care and control. Moreover, like conservationism, these two
concepts differ significantly from the philosophy of
preservationism. This latter paradigm grew out of the concern for
preserving wilderness areas in their natural state for their own
intrinsic aesthetic or spiritual value, without much ongoing
human intervention." Thus, sustainable development and
sustainable use extend basic conservationist principles to a global
scale, rather than depart from this existing philosophy.
Another possible reason that sustainable development attracts
many supporters is the concept's appeal for sharing the benefits of
global resources and development. The National Commission on
the Environment stated that "only healthy economies can generate
the resources necessary for investments in environmental protec-
tion." 2  For this reason, "[s]ustainable development has as its
goal a decent standard of living for all, coupled with maintenance
of the integrity of all environmental systems." 3 Sustainable
development thus holds a special interest for people in developing
countries, who endure many inequalities resulting from the
economic and political hegemony of stronger governments in the
Northern or Western Hemispheres.84
" See id at 9-14 (describing the growth and increasing activism of popular
conservation groups during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries).
" At its simplest,. preservationism means "[s]etting aside an area for
complete protection in its natural state." KENNETH A. ROSENBERG,
WILDERNESS PRESERVATION: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK 268 (1994). The
philosophy of preservationism, however, bases the goal of wilderness
preservation upon its intrinsic value, for reasons such as its aesthetic beauty, in
contrast to the instrumental and economic values esteemed by the conservation-
ists. But see Eugene C. Hargrove, The Historical Foundations of American
Environmental Attitudes, 1 ENVTL. ETHICS 209, 212-13 (1979) (noting that early
U.S. preservationists and conservationists shared many similarities that later
analysts have overlooked). For another account of these U.S. environmental
philosophies, see generally RODERICK NASH, WILDERNESS AND THE
AMERICAN MIND (3d ed. 1982).
82 CHOOSING A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE, supra note 25, at xv.
83 Id. at 2.
s See ADAM WATSON, THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY:
A COMPARATIVE HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 305-06 (1992) (noting that developing
countries are exerting increasing pressure for a more just distribution of wealth
and technology, as well as pressing for a "North-South dialogue" between the
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At present, "the worsening split between the developed nations
of the North and the developing nations of the South" creates one
of the most serious obstacles to global cooperation on environ-
mental issues.8 5 Under CITES, poorer range states contend that
they must bear a disproportionate share of the costs for protecting
species because no official mechanism for cost sharing exists.
8 6
Thus, sustainable development and sustainable use hold particular
interest for range states, which are eager to obtain some type of
desired return for their costly conservation efforts.1
7
3.3. Examples of Sustainable Use Programs
Advocates of sustainable use point to a number of successful
programs in which countries have applied this concept. Conserva-
tionists developed one such initiative in the Kaokoveld desert in
northwestern Namibia during the 1980s.88 After a drought led
two groups).
11 LAWRENCE E. SUSSKIND, ENVIRONMENTAL DIPLOMACY: NEGOTIATING
MORE EFFECTIVE GLOBAL AGREEMENTS 18-21 (1994).
86 See BONNER, supra note 1, at 158-59 (noting that the African nations
bear the greatest burden of elephant conservation, despite their pleas for
increased Western aid). Most African countries opposed the ivory trade ban,
feeling that "the developed world was continually making unfair environmental
demands on the undeveloped world" by requiring them to forego income from
the ivory trade without compensating them for the costs they had to bear. Id.
at 156. Many other developing countries from Asia and Latin America
supported the African nations for the same reason. See id.
8 This interest also affects many other environmental efforts pursued
jointly by Northern and Southern countries. For example, during negotiations
for the Convention on Biological Diversity, signed in Brazil in 1992, the Group
of 77 developing states worked toward:
(1) The establishment of special systems of intellectual property rights
and appropriate mechanisms for compensating the South for the
biological resources provided by it;
(2) The establishment of mechanisms giving the South access to the
biotechniques that are developed through the use of the genetic
resources that it provides; and
(3) Additional funding to facilitate implementation of the convention
and access to technology.
Alan E. Boyle, The Convention on Biological Diversity, in THE ENVIRONMENT
AFTER RIO: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 111, 113-14, (Luigi
Campiglio et al. eds., 1994). To a large extent, the developing nations
successfu lly met these objectives through the provisions of the convention. See
id. at 114.
88 See BONNER, supra note 1, at 19-33 (highlighting the successful efforts of
local tribespeople to combat game poaching wfile alowing for a controlled
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to the overhunting and near devastation of local wildlife, a
Western conservationist, Garth Owen-Smith, and a group of local
people organized a community game guard program. 9 The
program allowed local villagers to hunt only as much game as
they needed, sparing plentiful amounts of wildlife - wildlife
which the program's organizers realized could benefit the local
economy through increased Western tourism.1
Under this successful anti-poaching plan and a related project
helping the Namibian community of Purros benefit from its
wildlife, both the animals and their guards have flourished. 1 For
example, Purros villagers organized their own game rangers,
enacted a reasonable tax on tourists to support the community,
and produced crafts to sell to visitors.92 Buttressing this plan is
the fact that tourists "know that the money they are paying
makes them partners in a conservation project, that the communi-
ty is taking care of the wildlife[,] and [that] this is what they are
paying for."93 In 1989, the total cost of the community game
guard program was $30,000, with volunteer rangers being paid the
equivalent of twenty-five dollars per month plus food rations.94
The Purros project costs the villagers almost nothing, but
generates significant revenue for them.9
According to Owen-Smith, the involvement of people in the
immediate community constitutes the most important principle
for any sustainable use program because local support is essential
for its success.96 Programs are particularly successful when they
provide a specific benefit to the local community. For example,
amount of family hunting).
'9 See id. at 24. Through the game guard program, community residents
were recruited to watch over the local wildlife population and to help protect
it from foreign poachers. See id.
90 See id. at 23.
91 See id. at 31 ("Due to the successful anti-poaching program, wildlife [has]
begun to return to Purros.").
92 See id. at 31-33.
"' Id. at 33. The Purros community divides the tourist levy among its eight
families. The villagers explain that "'[i]t is as if we are farming wild-animals,
but instead of getting meat and skins from them, we get the money that the
tourists pay to see them. That is why we must look after our wild animals.'"
Id.
9' See id. (noting that funds for Purros' game guard program come almost
exclusively from a private foundation).
9s See id.
96 See id. at 34.
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the Pormpuraaw aboriginal tribe in Edward River, Australia now
benefits from breeding and selling skins from endangered saltwater
crocodiles, which the tribe hunted in the past." Their crocodile
farm, which began as a conservation project in 1973, has been so
successful that in 1992 it exported $340,000 worth of skins, a third
of the total exports for the Australian crocodile skin industry 8
In addition, the program provides members of the isolated
aboriginal community, which had 100 percent unemployment
before the project, with jobs, improved health care, and better
education.9 9  According to the Pormpuraaw tribe, farming
crocodiles is not difficult.'0 Thus, with a total of 12,000
crocodiles, the tribe's members believe there is no longer any
reason to ban completely trade in saltwater crocodile skins,
10'
although the animal still remains listed both on the U.S. endan-
gered species list and on Appendix II under CITES.'
Not all attempts at sustainable use of endangered species,
however, have met with such unqualified success. Sustainable use
programs are susceptible to fluctuations in worldwide demand for
a particular species. 3 For example, a large drop in demand for
alligator skins has harmed U.S. alligator farms, which, unlike their
Australian counterparts, have suffered great losses since late 1990,
when the worldwide demand for alligator skins plummeted.'
In a seemingly contradictory move, environmentalists now have
begun urging U.S. citizens to "'[b]uy alligator, if you can.'"105
In this case, environmentalists reason that controlled hunting and
I See Crocodile Skin Sales Boost Small Australian Tribe's Economy, L.A.
TIMEs, Sept. 6, 1993, at D3.
9g See id.
" See id.
100 See id. Crocodiles have survived for 200 million years, through the
dinosaur era and the ice age, and can breed for 40 years. See id.
101 See id.
102 See 50 C.F.R. S 17.11 (1993); see also CITES SOURGEBOOK, supra note
10, at 76, 94 (Providing a list of all Appendix I and HI species, and showing that
Australian populations of the estuarine crocodile, genusC porosus, are exempt
from the Appendix I listing, but subject to some restrictions on commercial
trade under Appendix II).
103 See William Booth, Bag a Gator and Save the Species: Environmentalists
Link Habitat Preservation to Sales of Skins, WASH. POST, Aug. 25, 1993, at Al.
104 See id.
105 Id. at A14 (quoting Ginette Hemley, director of a wildlife trade
monitoring program at the World Wildlife Fund in Washington, D.C.).
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ranching have helped to protect both the alligators and the
freshwater marshes in which they live.' 6 Unless the value of
this species increases, its local protectors no longer will have an
incentive to save the alligators or to refrain from draining the half
of their habitat that still remains undeveloped. 07
Species that fail to breed well in captivity pose a further
problem for sustainable use programs." 8 Under CITES criteria,
Management Authorities must allow commercial trade in
Appendix I species for specimens bred in captivity for commercial
purposes,'0 9 as well as "ranched" offspring of wild parents
produced in programs meeting a very strict set of guidelines. n0
Complying with the requirements of these exceptions, however,
is not easy. For example, all efforts to breed sea turtles in
captivity have failed to reach their ultimate goal: the production
of a viable second generation of offspring from a generation
already bred in captivity."'
Proponents of sustainable use contend that all sea turtle captive
breeding and ranching operations should be supported under
CITES because they improve the survival rate of wild eggs and
hatchlings and provide income for local peoples."2 They also
argue that the sale of farm-raised turtles helps to curb the demand
for wild turtles, thus protecting wild populations."' Opponents
of sustainable use counter that ongoing dependence on wild
106 See id. at Al, A14.
107 See id.
108 See FITZGERALD, supra note 10, at 9. Species that have difficulty
reproducing will be unable to sustain captive populations that can produce
commercial harvests, a common component of sustainable use programs. See
id.
109 See CITES, supra note 2, 27 U.S.T. at 1099-1100, 993 U.N.T.S. at 249.
110 See Marine Turtle Ranching, supra note 29, at 124, Conf. 9.20. The
distinction drawn between ranching and captive breeding is that between "the
rearing in a controlled environment of specimens taken from the wild," and the
rearing of offspring born or produced in a controlled environment of parents
that mated in a controlled environment. FAvRE, GUIDE TO CITES, supra note
21, at 188-89.
" See FITZGERALD, supra note 10, at 233; see also FAVRE, GUIDE TO
CITES, supra note 21, at 186-212 (detailing the requirements for captive-
breeding and ranching programs). This failure occurred in spite of an intensive
10-year effort by the largest turtle farm, Cayman Turtle Farms Ltd. of the
Cayman Islands, to produce second-generation offspring. See FITZGERALD,
supra note 10, at 234.
112 See FITZGERALD, supra note 10, at 233.
13 See id. at 233-34.
[Vol. 17:1
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol17/iss1/15
SUSTAINABLE USE UNDER CITES
populations for eggs leads to the programs' failure to achieve their
goals.114 In addition, they add that farm-raised turtles are more
expensive than wild-caught specimens, so they do not benefit local
turtle consumers.11 Furthermore, the sale of ranched turtles
does not necessarily benefit local peoples. According to critics,
those who need the income most are neither farming the turtles
nor reaping the benefits."6 Moreover, such sales also may
increase pressure on wild populations rather than relieve it,
especially if this effort leads to the reopening of the U.S. market,
which has been closed to green turtle products since 1979.
These recurring arguments help outline the greater debate over the
viability of sustainable use of endangered species now facing all
CITES member states.
3.4. Arguments for Sustainable Use
Supporters of sustainable use contend that some type of change
is needed, especially since CITES has not worked for many of the
most threatened endangered species that its authors intended it to
protect."' Sustainable use programs are arguably superior to
their preservationist counterparts in a number of ways. Because
a benefit is derived from the species' protection, such programs
114 See id. at 234.
115 See id.
116 See id.
117 See id.
1 See supra notes 5-9 and accompanying text for examples of this failure.
CITES has been particularly unsuccessful in protecting some of the world's
most valuable species, such as the rhino. According to wildlife officials'
estimates, during roughly the same time period that the Convention has been
in force, Africa's black rhino population decreased from 65,000 rhinos in 1970
to fewer than 3,000 rhinos by 1993. See Remer Tyson, Herds Pay Highest Price,
DET. FREE PRESS, Mar. 8, 1993, at 1A. For this reason, Zimbabwe's wildlife
officials have proposed lifting the 19-year-old CITES ban against the sale of
rhino horn in a last-ditch effort to save their remaining rhinos. See id.
According to one official, the CITES ban
hasn't made a difference to what is happening in the field. Horn is
more valuable than gold. That's why we have to enter the market [to
sell approximately $10 million worth of stockpiled elephant tusks and
rhinoceros horns, to raise cash needed for enforcement, and perhaps
to cause demand to drop, diminishing poaching]. Otherwise, the rhino
will be a museum piece. I think it will be anyway.
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are usually less expensive than other conservation programs.119
Moreover, the cost of preservationist anti-poaching efforts cannot
be measured in money alone. For example, Zimbabwean
National Parks anti-poaching units have killed 167 poachers since
1984, while four rangers have been killed and another eight
119 Preservationist efforts to protect endangered species are frequently very
expensive. See, e.g., Tyson, supra note 118, at 1A (detailing the costs of
Zimbabwean conservation programs). For example, the Zimbabwean unit
protecting that country's black rhinos needed $100,000 to provide protection
during the four months remaining in its fiscal year, according to the chief
warden of Zimbabwe's National Parks. See id.
Large outlays also do not guarantee a program's success. For example, in
1979 the World Wildlife Fund spent $500,000 on a project to save the rhinos
in Zambia's Luangwa Valley, one of the organization's largest investments ever.
See BONNER, supra note 1, at 85. Within just a few years, however, the project
had failed, and poachers virtually had eliminated this rhino population. See id.
The recent effort to protect African elephants provides another example of
the high costs of implementing conservationist policies. Following the meeting
of CITES member nations in Lausanne, Switzerland in 1989, at which member
states banned all trade in ivory, representatives of African nations with
elephants estimated that they required $500 million merely for the capital needs
involved in protecting their elephants, without considering recurring expenses.See id at 158. When the United States pledged $2 million for elephant conser-
vation throughout Africa, a representative from Zimbabwe's wildlife depart-
ment responded that this amount only would support his department for twoyears. See id.In this situati n and others, developing African nations were
required to bear the greatest share of the burden for preserving their wildlife,
even though wealthier nations had initiated the ban, thus exacerbating alreadypresent North-South tensions. See iat at 158-59.
In contrast, sustainable use conservation programs cost much less than their
preservationist counterparts. In fact, some suistainable use programs are able toprovide for all of their own conservation costs, while also improving conditions
for local peoples. See, e.g., id. at 268 (providing an example of one suchsuccessful program). In Nyaminyami, Zimbabwe, for example, the CAMPFIRE
sustainable use program allows for the culling of local hierds of impala and
other animals by both villagers and outside hunters. See id. at 261-66. The
local population, formerly sufffering from severe malnutrition, now has doubled
or tripled its annual supply of meat protein, while the money earned from the
limited huntin program paid for all 12 of the district's game rangers, equipped
rangers with a sl of their equipment and rations, and provided them with a
stipend of $100 per month. See id. at 266, 268. This ranger unit was one of
the best paid and equipped units in Africa. See id. at 268.
Kenya, which has relied on preservationist-stle programs, currently
receives more than $150 million from the internationalcommunity for its
conservation efforts. See id. at 278. According to David Western, a prominent
Kenyan conservationist, Kenya would need only a fraction of that aid if its
communal and private landownerser re allowed to reap the benefits of sustain-
able utilization. See id. With this incentive for landowners toprotect wildlife,
the Kenya Wildlife Service "would have become financially sel-sufficient fairly
quickly,' instead of being locked into dependence on [foreign] aid. Id.
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wounded during the same period.12 Additionally, during this
time, Zimbabwe lost 300 rhinos in two years, despite its hard-line
preservationist policies.121 Therefore, sustainable use programs,
by providing a viable alternative to poaching, can help to cut
poaching's heavy toll in human lives.'2
A final cost involved in preservation programs is that cost
absorbed by communal and private landowners, many of whom
practice subsistence farming. For example, these landowners have
no protection against elephants that may roam free through their
lands and trample their farms.1" While tourists may enjoy the
sight of elephants walking through their camp, "[a] hundred miles
away, elephants might be walking through [farmers'] fields,
120 See Tyson, supra note 118, at lA.
121 See BONNER, supra note 1, at 18 (stating that poachers killed 300 rhinos
during 1986 and 1987 in Zimbabwe's Zambezi Valley alone, where most rhino
poaching has taken place).
1 Poverty is frequently thought to be the major factor involved in
poaching. See Tyson, supra note 118, at IA. Poachers who are willing to risk
their lives come from very impoverished areas, and take such risks because even
a single tusk sold for a pittance on the underground market "can feed a
poacher's family for three or four months." Id Similar situations can be found
in many countries where poaching occurs. In India and Nepal, for example,
poachers are able to make the equivalent of 10 years' income from one tiger.
See John W. Anderson, Poachers Felling World's Tigers, Rhinos, WASH. POST,
Nov. 29, 1994, at Al, A18. Because ofbooming economies in Southeast Asia,
prices for tiger and rhino derivatives have soared, leading to rampant poaching
and corruption at even the highest levels in the exporting countries' govern-
ments. See id. In Zimbabwe, where poachers can earn more for killing a rhino
than many Africans make in a year, "[mioney will be the downfall of the
rhino," according to Glenn Tatham, the chief warden of Zimbabwe's
Department of National Parks and Wildlife Management. Nothing Seems Able
to Save the Rhinoceros, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Nov. 27, 1994, at A23. Tatham insists
that "[w]hile there's poverty, political instability[,] and social decline, there's no
way prohibition can succeed." Id.
The sustainable use of endangered species provides an alternate form of
income for people who otherwise might rely on poaching to supplement their
meager incomes. By reducing the economic destitution and disparities at the
root of poaching, sustainable use is more likely than preservationist plans to
discourage this practice. Moreover, sustainable use programs may succeed in
changing negative attitudes toward conservation efforts. When villagers living
around a protected park make money from its wildlife, for example, "[i]n effect,
the park becomes Itheir] bank and the wild animals in the park their assets.
This will provide a powerful incentive against poaching: people are not likely
to rob their own bank, and will report those rho do." BONNER, supra note
1, at 278.
1 See Tyson, supra note 118, at IA.
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destroying crops[,] and endangering peoples' lives."' 4 Residents
of range states have criticized CITES and other conservation
efforts for failing to address such social and economic issues as the
damage inflicted by endangered species on their human neigh-
bors. 25  Sustainable use programs avoid such criticisms by
providing reasonable benefits for range state residents bearing the
burden of costly incursions by the endangered species they must
protect.
As described above, successful sustainable use programs are
those which involve local peoples in their planning and implemen-
tation. 12  By involving and benefitting local residents, sustain-
able use programs may help to ease the political tensions that have
led to the failure of the more traditional conservation programs
imposed upon developing countries by developed nations."
In addition to their greater chance of success, sustainable use
programs may help to avoid painful moral and ethical issues.
Under these programs, outsiders no longer can impose burden-
some conservation programs on indigenous peoples without
consulting or involving them.12 1 One U.S. reporter notes that
"[s]ustainable use adds a new twist to the classic battle between the
international haves and have-nots."' 9 Like many other treaties,
CITES often involves conflicts between wealthier nations, which
generally take a pro-preservationist stance, and between cash-poor
but resource-rich developing nations.13  Perhaps for these
reasons, an African conservation program director deems the right
to sustainable use by developing nations "'vital to the long-term
health"' of CITES, and "'a principle of paramount importance for
conservation in all of Africa. ' 131
124 Id.
125 See id.
126 See discussion supra section 3.3.
12 In one case, when a huge western-funded rhino preservation project
failed, two separate agencies attributed its collapse to the fact that it was
"'administerec[predominantly by the white community.'" BONNER, supra note
1, at 85. Analysts noted that "the local people were not involved in planning
or implementing the project, so they viewedit as they viewed programs forced
upon them during the colonial era." Id.
12 See Cone, Conflict, supra note 13, at A26.
129 Id.
130 See id.
131 Id.
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3.5. Arguments Against Sustainable Use
3.5.1. Difficulties in Developing a Common Definition
of Sustainable Use
Opponents of sustainable use argue against the policy for
various reasons. Perhaps the most fundamental concern is that
some authority must be found to determine which uses of which
endangered species are sustainable. Given the difficulties in
determining such fundamental notions as what constitutes a
species or a specimen under CITES,"' it seems unlikely that all
parties could have agreed on a common definition of sustainable
use. Such a definition was formulated, however, under the
requirements for CITES export permits in Articles III and IV,
which states that sustainable use is activity that is "not ...
detrimental to the survival of the species involved.""' There-
fore, CITES already may accommodate the sustainable use of
Appendix I species to a limited extent.13
4
132 See FAVRE, GUIDE TO CITES, supra note 21, at 3, 12-19 (noting that
CITES' purported definition of "species fails to adequately narrow the term
at all, and discussing the many difficulties involved in defining the term
specimen").
"3 CITES, supra note 2, 27 U.S.T. at 1096, 993 U.N.T.S. at 248.
134 This same accommodation is not true, however, for Appendix I species,
which currently cannot enter into any kind of commercial trade. See CITES,
supra note 2, 27 U.S.T. at 1093-94, 993 U.N.T.S. at 264-47. If member nations
agreed on the provision, CITES could be amended to permit non-detrimental
commercial trade in Appendix I species. See id. at 1110-12, 993 U.N.T.S. at
254-55. This amendment, however, would be subject to the same problems
already associated with existing CITES trade requirements. See discussion supra
section 2.4.
Difficulties arise when, because of poor funding and staffing, national
agencies issue export permits and make "no-detriment" findings with little basis
in biological fact. See Mark C. Trexler & Laura H. Kosl-off, International
Implementation: The Longest Arm of the Law?, in BALANCING ON THE BRINK
OF EXTINCTION: THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT AND LESSONS FOR THE
FUTURE 114, 122-23 (Kathryn A. Kohm ed., 1991) [hereinafter BRINK OF
EXTINCTION]. Similar to the United States, political pressures within
developing countries may lead Scientific Authorities to make accommodations
detrimental to species which they are supposed to protect. See Michael J. Bean,
Looking Back over the First Fifteen Years, in BRINK OF EXTINCTION, supra, at
37, 41-42. Political pressures in range countries, however, may lessen as
economic conditions gradually improve and people begin to recognize the value
of preserving their endangered species. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying
text.
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Where CITES permits such use, it is the Scientific Authority
in a given range country that determines what is or is not
detrimental, and thus which types of commercial and non-
commercial uses are sustainable. 35 While not officially within
the scope of CITES, parties to the Convention could adopt a
resolution recommending that any domestic "sustainable use" of
an endangered species in a member nation should likewise be
approved by the Scientific Authority before being permitted.136
3.5.2. Inadequate and Unequal Protection for
Endangered Species
Even if a common definition of sustainable use could be
determined and implemented easily, sustainable use programs
might not lead to added protection for all species. Opponents
contend that because of its emphasis on the utilization of species,
sustainable use tends to favor only those species that have a
current economic value.13  Such detractors are concerned that
1 See CITES, supra note 2, 27 U.S.T. at 1093, 1095, 993 U.N.T.S. at 246-
47. For Appendix I species, the Scientific Authority of the state of import
makes an additional determination. See id at 1093-94, 993 U.N.T.S. at 246.
Arguably, this requirement should apply to commercial trade in Appendix I
species, if it were permitted.
It is plausible that, given the problems existing CITES agencies face, it
would be preferable to create another group to oversee sustainable use
programs. This oversight would lead, however, to a costly duplication of effort
and a division of limited existing resources. For this reason, it would be prefer-
able to strengthen the already-existing structure under CITES, rather than to
initiate another program.
136 Even this unenforceable resolution might raise complaints about its
adverse effect on state sovereignty. It is possible, however, that CITES can
provide the opportunity to supplement the existing resources devoted to the
Convention and wildlife management, while avoiding the perception of infring-
ing on national sovereignty. See Trexler & Kosloff, supra note 134, at 129 n.11.
This could be accomplished principally by providing technical assistance, special
funding, and staff to CITES implementing agencies in exporting countries, an
initiative which some parties have already proposed. See id. at 128-29. If
CITES member states implemented this cooperative program, Scientific
Authorities could assume many conservation functions in their respective
countries, while researchers could obtain additional data on which to base
future no-detriment findings. See id. CITES member states also could provide
assistance and expertise to help range countries develop sustainable use
programs and habitat conservation efforts, with CITES conferences serving as
a forum for exchanging information on these initiatives. See id.
137 See, e.g., Curtis H. Freese & Carlos J. Saavedra, Prospects for Wildlife
Management in Latin America and the Caribbeati, in NEOTROPICAL WILDLIFE
USE AND CONSERVATION 430, 431 Gohn G. Robinson & Kent H. Redford
[Vol. 17:1
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol17/iss1/15
SUSTAiNABLE USE UNDER CITES
"[i]f wildlife has no value, then wildlife and its habitat will be
destroyed to make way for other land uses."138 This problem is
particularly acute for those species lacking any apparent use.139
Examples include species not generally used for consumption, such
as the many types of species in disappearing tropical rain forests,
which can be endangered by loss of habitat before their value can
be discovered.' 40 This problem also may affect more well-
known species, especially those so severely endangered that any
consumptive use of the species is not sustainable.14' A similar
problem confronts those species whose rate of reproduction is
slow, even under optimum conditions.
14 2
Sustainable use, however, need not place any of the above-
eds., 1991) ("The survival of many species and ecosystems in Latin America and
the Caribbean will require that those species and ecosystems and their products
have a utilitarian value.").
Commercial trade, however, is only one of many ways in which
endangered species can have value. See John G. Robinson & Kent H. Redford,
The Use and Conservation of Wildlife, in NEOTROPICAL WILDLIFE USE AND
CONSERVATION, supra, at 34. Wildlife uses may be consumptive, either in the
range country or abroad, including such uses as hunting for food or sport,
ranching, and the use of various p arts or derivatives for clothing, medicine,
works of art, collections, and the like. See id. Wildlife utilization also can be
nonconsumptive, including such uses as tourism and other types of recreation,
scientific study, and aesthetic and spiritual uses. See id.
138 Robinson & Redford, supra note 137, at 3.
139 See id.
140 See, e.g., EDWARD 0. WILSON, THE DIVERSITY OF LIFE 273-76 (1992)
("[W]e do not know to the nearest order of magnitude how many species exist
on earth in the first place. Probably fewer than [10%] have even been given a
scientific name. ... It is possible, though, to get a handle on the richest
environment of all, the tropical rain forests, and to make a rough estimate of
the extinction rates of species there. . . . [I]f deforestation continues for [30]
more years at the present rate, one tenth to one quarter of the rain forest
species will disappear. If the rain forests are as rich in diversity as most
biologists think, their reduction alone will eliminate [at least 5% to 10%] of all
the species on earth in [30] years.").
141 See FITZGERALD, supra note 10, at 123. One such example of a seriously
depleted species is the southern sea otter, once considered extinct and now
found in small numbers along the California coast. See id. This population,
estimated at 1,800 animals, is extremely vulnerable to both environmental
threats and human intervention. See id.
142 Whales, for example, mature slowly and have very low reproductive
rates, leaving them particularly vulnerable to pressures from any type of
hunting. See id. at 146 (describing the successive decline of the world's whale
species as they became the targets of overhunting). Depending upon the
species, it takes whales from four to twenty-six years to reach breeding age,
when they may give birth to a single calf once every two to five years. See id.
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mentioned species at a greater risk than already exists.
Nonconsumptive uses, such as environmentally-conscious tourism,
would not exacerbate existing problems. 43 Moreover, to the
extent that sustainable use programs would encourage habitat
preservation for any endangered species, entire ecosystems,
including perhaps other species less likely to be protected, would
share in the benefit.144
3.5.3. Fluctuations in Consumptive Value
An additional difficulty arises when a species having consump-
tive value suddenly declines in value due to changing consumer
tastes, a falling economy, or some other variable. 4  Alligators
currently farmed in Florida, for example, have a much lower
consumptive value than they did in 1990, leading to a renewed
threat to this population. 46  Consequently, the species' chance
for survival depends largely upon the initiative of the local
alligator farmers, who have a far greater incentive to explore
strategies for preserving alligators than they would if no possibili-
ty for their sustainable use had ever existed. 4
In many cases, when an endangered species lacks consumptive
value, its nonconsumptive value may help to protect it, thus
mitigating its lack of consumptive value. 148  Species having
nonconsumptive values often receive interest from a constituency
143 See generally Martha J. Groom et al., Tourism as a Sustained Use of
Wildlife: A Case Study of Madre de Dios, Southeastern Peru, in NEOTROPIcAL
WILDLIFE USE AND CONSERVATION, supra note 137, at 393 (discussing the
benefit of tourism, and examining in particular its effect in the Madre de Dios
region).
144 See, e.g., Booth, supra note 103, at Al, A14 (noting that giving an
endangered species such as the alligator "a value gives [its] habitat a value,"
helping to preserve environments such as Florida's wetlands, half of which has
already been destroyed); Alfred L. Gardner, Foreword to NEOTROPICAL
WILDLIFE USE AND CONSERvATION, supra note 137, at xi ("[G]iven the reali-
ties of our economically driven society, species could be saved by cropping
some individuals to justify saving the habitat, which ultimately is critical for all
species, including those having little or no perceived economic value.").
1 See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
146 See supra notes 103-07 and accompanying text.
117 See Booth, supra note 103, at A14 (reiterating that "[t]here's little
question in our minds that controlled hunting and ranching has helped provide
incentives to protect both the species and the habitat").
148 See BONNER, supra note 1, at 31-33 (discussing the villagers' interest in
preserving the local wildlife because of increased tourism revenues).
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of environmental groups, leading to organized preservation ef-
forts. 149 In the United States, according to one estimate, at least
fifty percent of post-1973 Endangered Species Act listings resulted
from the presence of a visible constituency for the species
listed.'50 Problems arise, however, for endangered species
lacking a nonconsumptive value, and thus a constituency among
the public.151 In the words of one writer, "'Save the Whale!' can
summon a crusade. 'Save the manatee!' summons a question:
'What's a manatee?"'152 Like manatees, many other less popular
species suffer for lack of public support. A regime of sustainable
use under CITES might not offer much increase in protection for
manatees and other species with low consumptive value and no
visible constituency, except where there is the possibility of
habitat protection when more highly valued endangered species
share the same ecosystem.
3.5.4. Sustainable Use's Limited Effectiveness
For some types of "problem" species it is possible that not
much would change if CITES permitted the sustainable use of
endangered species. These cases illustrate the limits beyond which
sustainable use may have little effect on existing problems
occurring under CITES' preservationist-style programs. For
instance, it is possible that allowing sustainable use of all endan-
gered species would have a limited effect on some problems
currently arising under CITES, including cross-border poaching.
The lack of funds to finance anti-poaching patrols, the high value
of the animals hunted, and the low risk of punishment provide an
incentive for poachers to disregard CITES regulations.1 3
One example of cross-border poaching occurs in Zimbabwe,
where poachers cross the Zambezi River from impoverished
Zambia to target black rhinos and elephants.1 4 Zimbabwean
149 See, eg., YAFFEE, supra note 12, at 134-37 (listing the "enormous
network of environmental groups in the United States . . . [whose] interests
range from animal rights to endangered species preservation").
150 See id. at 134.
151 See id. at 72-73 (stating that thepriority of a species on the endangered
list turns on the economic, commercia, and popularity value of that species).
152 Id. at 135 (citation omitted).
See Tyson, supra note 118, at Al.
154 See id.
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anti-poaching units have been unable to pursue these poachers
back across the river because Zimbabwe lacks the requisite
agreement with Zambia."'5
While a CITES-based sustainable use program may do little to
help these endangered populations, several African countries
already have implemented a more effective remedy.156 On
September 9, 1994, South Africa and five other African countries
signed the Lusaka Agreement, which is designed to reduce and
ultimately to eliminate international trafficking in African
wildlife. 157 This accord establishes the world's first international
wildlife task force, equipped to conduct cross-border operations,
and to facilitate closer cooperation and sharing of information
between national law enforcement bureaus.15  The Lusaka
Agreement, which receives financial support from the govern-
ments of the United States, Canada, Denmark, Norway, and the
United Kingdom, is open for accession by all African states.159
Another critical problem that endangered species face is habitat
loss or degradation, as well as related concerns, including rapid
human population growth in range countries and the introduction
of exotic species."O Whether or not sustainable use programs
exist, CITES can do little to control directly threats posed by
these and other factors which are inherently beyond its scope.
161
Proponents of sustainable use argue, however, that sustainable use
programs promote knowledge about endangered species and their
155 See id.
156 See Zambia: African States Set Up International Wildlife Task Force, BBC
MONITORING SERVICE, Sept. 12, 1994, available in WESTLAW, Int-News
Database.
157 See id.
158 See id.
159 See id.
1" Habitat loss is currently the single greatest cause of the extinction of
wild species. See F. Wayne King, Thirteen Milestones on the Road to Extinction,
in THE ROAD TO EXTINCTION: PROBLEMS OF CATEGORIZING THE STATUS
OF TAXA THREATENED WITH EXTINCTION 7, 10 (Richard Fitter & Maisie
Fitter eds., 1987). Among the other major factors contributing to extinction
are the fragmentation of ranges, profound reduction in reproductive success,
excessive competition from introduced species, hybridization, and the extinction
of co-evolved dependent species. See Id. at 11-16; see also Trexler & Kosloff,
supra note 134, at 117-18, 120 (discussing habitat loss and related factors not
directly addressed by CITES).
161 See Trexler & Kosloff, supra note 134, at 120 (discussing the limited
scope of CITES).
[Vol. 17:1
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol17/iss1/15
SUSTAINABLE USE UNDER CITES
value, and thus contribute indirectly to alleviating problems
unrelated to international trade.162 Because sustainable use has
the potential to enhance local residents' appreciation of and
concern for endangered species, the existence of problems
unrelated to sustainable use should not by itself prevent imple-
mentation of sustainable use programs, as long as the uses allowed
truly are sustainable.
3.5.5. Failure to Distinguish Legal From Illegal Trade
In addition to the above-mentioned difficulties, opponents of
sustainable use argue that it fails to address directly the problem
of distinguishing between species traded legally and illegally, a
major enforcement issue under CITES.163 One commentator
notes that "[a] skin that is the product of illegal overexploitation
looks no different when crossing international borders than a skin
produced by a rational (and legal) management regime."6 For
many species, however, if a sustainable use program such as
ranching were permitted, legal trade could be increased. This legal
trade would ultimately lower prices and make illegal import of the
species less profitable. By changing the economic factors responsi-
ble for poaching and illegal trade, sustainable use may provide, at
a minimum, a partial solution to this problem.
3.5.6. Inability to Obtain Reliable Data
A final problem under CITES is obtaining reliable data
regarding the productive capacities of wild populations and the
international wildlife trade, as well as genuinely sustainable rates
of use.165 This inability to collect reliable data has plagued
CITES since its inception, because data needed to support CITES'
appendices did not exist in 1973, and still is unavailable today.66
Compliance with the Convention's annual reporting requirement
for member countries in Article VII(6)-(7) "has been and continues
162 See discussion supra section 3.3 (discussing how a sustainable use
program has helped to stop poaching for personal use in one African village).
163 See Trexler & Kosloff, supra note 134, at 122.
164 Id. at 121.
165 See generally id. at 122-23 (noting that export permits are issued without
sufficient biological information to support the no-detriment findings required
by CITES).
166 See id. at 123.
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to be an embarrassment.... [I]t was reported that for the period
[between] 1981 to 1985 only [fifty-two to sixty-five percent] of the
[CITES member nations] submitted any report at all. Some
[member states] .-. had not submitted even one of the annual
reports during these five years."16 A timely analysis of these
figures is essential for updating CITES appendices, monitoring
wild populations, and identifying areas in which illegal trade may
be taking place.16 Obtaining accurate figures on wildlife popu-
lations and their reproduction rates is critical if sustainable use is
permitted, especially for Appendix I species.169
A program of sustainable use could alleviate the problem of
data collection and reporting in several ways. First, participation
in all sustainable use programs under CITES' jurisdiction should
be voluntary. Any member nations wishing to participate in
these programs or hoping to import species made available
through sustainable use programs could be required to comply
with several new requirements in order to do so.
Second, countries wishing to benefit in any way from
sustainable use programs could be required to fulfill all existing
reporting obligations. Those countries seeking to implement
programs also would bear the burden of proving that any use
under the proposed projects would be sustainable.1 70  This
requirement would provide an incentive to both collect initial data
to support the request and to conduct follow-up studies to justify
the program's continuation. For those countries unable to finance
the necessary data collection projects, the CITES Secretariat
1 71
temporarily could provide scientific personnel. 72
Third, those countries allowed to implement sustainable use
167 FAVRE, GUIDE TO CITES, supra note 21, at 237.
16 See Heppes & McFadden, supra note 59, at 232-33.
169 See id. at 235 (noting that compliance with the reporting requirements
of CITES is of crucial importance as it now exists). If the CITES parties were
to adopt a sustainable use policy, these requirements would become even more
important, since information regarding natural re-population is central to deter-
mining what level of use is sustainable.
170 See Favre, Debate, supra note 22, at 893 (providing a detailed discussion
of the importance of burden of proof.
"'1 The CITES Secretariat consists of the administrative staff provided for
and funded by the original CITES agreement. See CITES, supra note 2, 27
U.S.T. at 1106, 993 U.N.T.S. at 252; see also FAvRE, GuIDE TO CITES, supra
note 21, at 282 (discussing the functions of the CITES Secretariat).
172 See Trexler & Kosloff, supra note 134, at 128-29 (detailing how CITES
can provide assistance and expertise to other nations).
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programs might be required to provide a small percentage of the
income from these programs to the CITES Secretariat for use in
data collection and other scientific efforts. In this way, most
CITES countries would have an incentive to provide better and
more timely data in accordance with CITES requirements, as well
as to support and make use of the existing expertise. Countries
refusing to comply with these new requirements would face
penalties in the form of the threat and the eventual imposition of
CITES-based trade sanctions. 73
Finally, assuming that member states resolve the preceding
problems, parties practicing sustainable use under the Convention
must be able to ensure that the utilization of the exploited species
will not exceed their productive capacities 74  Critics and
supporters alike should agree that the careful monitoring of
sustainable use programs is essential to their success. Thus,
adopting a program of sustainable use could give CITES authori-
ties the necessary leverage to overcome its logistical difficulties.
173 In 1994, the United States imposed limited restrictions, for the first
time, on the import of wildlife products from Taiwan in an attempt to penalize
that country for its continuing trade in rhino and tiger parts and products. See
59 Fed. Reg. 22,043 (1994); see also Tom Kenworthy, President Imposes Sanctions
on Taiwan, WASH. POST, Apr. 12, 1994, at C1 ("The decision marks the first
time the United States has used import prohibitions as a weapon to pressure
other nations to protect endangered wildlife. It also represents an important
escalation in a worldwide campaign to defend the two mammals."). After
imposing the much-discussed sanction against Taiwan, the United States
imposed a further ban on importing certain animal species from 12 other
countries, at the request of the CITES Secretariat, for their refusal to comply
with various CITES requirements. For a complete listing of these sanctions,
see 59 Fed. Reg. 63,101 (1994).
174 See WORLD CONSERVATION STRATEGY, supra note 17, at 451 (stating
that this assurance is a "priority requirement" for sustainable utilization). With
the suggested monitoring requirements in place, Scientific Authorities in range
countries should be able to monitor closely those species exploited through
sustainable use programs. This system will allow much more time for inter-
vention than the current program provides. At present, "[parties do not] notice
something until there's a crisis," by which time it may aready be too late to
save the species. See Joy Aschenbach, Conservationists Trying Radical Ways to
Preserve 'Megaspecies', L.A. TIMES, June 20, 1993, at A22 (quoting Diana
McMeekin, executive vice president of the African Wildlife Foundation).
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4. THE CURRENT U.S. FRAMEWORK FOR REGULATING
TRADE IN ENDANGERED SPECIES UNDER THE ESA
4.1. History of the ESA
In the United States, CITES was officially implemented by the
Endangered Species Act ("ESA"), enacted in 1973, soon after the
signing of the Convention in Washington, D.C."5 Although
the United States was the first country to ratify CITES, the U.S
enforcement program under the ESA did not begin until four
years after the Senate ratified the Convention, when the President
designated CITES Management and Scientific Authorities, and the
Secretary of the Interior promulgated final regulations.
176
4.2. Purpose of the ESA
The ESA's provisions extend beyond the implementation of
CITES."z Since the ESA also protects endangered species in the
United States, some of its objectives differ from those of the
175 See Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. % 1531-44 (1988). The
ESA also extends beyond CITES to cover domestic U.S. issues such as recovery
plans and the acquisition of critical habitat for domestic endangered species.
his Comment considers only those portions of the ESA that implement
CITES.
Certain other statutes also are applicable when CITES species are involved.
These statutes include the Lacey Act Amendments of 1981, 16 U.S.C. §§ 3371-
78 (1988), which plays an important role in implementing CITES by allowing
U.S. sanctions for violations of foreign law regarding wildlife. "Non-
environmental" statutes that the United States uses in wildlife trade enforce-
ment include customs, smuggling, conspiracy, quarantine, and mail fraud
statutes. See Laura H. Kosloff & Mark C. Trexler, The Convention on
International Trade in Endangered Species: Enforcement Theory and Practice in
the United States, 5 B.U. INT' Lg.J. 327, 348-53 (1987). For a discussion of the
evolution of U.S. federal wildlife law, including the laws preceding the ESA, see
YAFFEE, supra note 12, at 32-57.
"76 See Kosloff & Trexler, supra note 175, at 343 (giving a brief history of
CITES' implementation under the ESA); Exec. Order No. 11,911, 41 Fed. Reg.
15,683 (1976) (providing that the Secretary of the Interior be designated as the
Management Authority, and establishing the Endangered Species Scientific
Authority as the Scientific Authority). President Ronald Reagan later
consolidated these authorities when he revoked the Executive Order No. 11,911
in 1987. See Exec. Order No. 12,608, 52 Fed. Reg. 34,617 (1987). The final
U.S. regulations, promulgated in 1977, appear at 50 C.F.R. §§ 23.1-.57 (1993).
S177 See Kosloff & Trexler, supra note 176, at 345 (stating that the ESA is
more broadly defined" than CITES and that "[t]he legislation implementing
CITES consists of only a small portion of the ESA") (citation omitted).
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Convention. 178 A number of clauses relevant to CITES are
found among its statements of findings.17 9 In addition, the ESA
gives the following statement of its goals:
The purposes of this chapter are to provide a means
whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered species
and threatened species depend may be conserved, to
provide a program for the conservation of such endangered
species and threatened species, and to take such steps as
may be appropriate to achieve the purposes of the treaties
and conventions set forth in subsection (a) of this sec-
tion."O
178 See id. at 345 n.82 (describing, for example, the different purposes found
in the preambles of the ESA and CITES).
179 The ESA provisions relevant to CITES include the following:
(1) various species of fish, wildlife, and plants in the United States
have been rendered extinct as a consequence of economic growth and
development untempered by adequate concern and conservation;
(2) other species of fish, wildlife, and plants have been so depleted
in numbers that they are in danger of or threatened with extinction;
(3) these species of fish, wildlife, and plants are of esthetic,
ecological, educational, historical, recreational, and scientific value to
the Nation and its people;
(4) the United States has pledged itself as a sovereign state in the
international community to conserve to the extent practicable the
various species of fish or wildlife and plants facing extinction, pursuant
to...
(F) the Convention on International Trade in Endangered
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora....
(5) encouraging the States and other interested parties, through
Feder financi assistance and a system of incentives, to develop and
maintain conservation programs which meet national and international
standards is a key to meeting the Nation's international commitments
and to better safeguarding, for the benefit of all citizens, the Nation's
heritage in fish, wildlife, and plants.
16 U.S.C. S 1531(a) (1988).
"' Id. S 1531(b). The complete list of treaties and conventions found in
subsection (a) includes the following:
A) migratory bird treaties with Canada and Mexico;
(B) the Migratory and Endangered Bird Treaty with Japan;
C) the Convention on Nature Protection and Wildlife Preserva-
tion in the Western Hemisphere;
(D) the International Convention for the Northwest Atlantic
Fisheries;
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Thus, the ESA adopts by incorporation the purposes of CITES.
Like CITES, the ESA contains statements of both conservationist
and preservationist principles: conservation is mentioned directly
in sections 1531(a)(4), (a)(5), and (b),181 while the preservationist
goal of protecting wildlife for its inherent aesthetic value partly
underlies section 1531(a)(3)."82 The ESA, however, also encour-
ages the development of conservation programs to meet its
international commitments, indicating that conservationism,
rather than preservationism, is its major focus.
8 4
4.3. Functions of the ESA
The ESA currently designates the Secretary of the Interior as
both the CITES Management Authority and the Scientific
Authority for the United States.' The U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service ("FWS") performs the actual functions of these authori-
ties. 86 The ESA prohibits both trading in any endangered
species in violation of CITES and possessing any specimens of
endangered species illegally traded. Sections 1540(a)(1) and
(b)(1) provide for both civil and criminal penalties for viola-
tors,188 including a maximum of $50,000 in fines and up to one
year in prison for each criminal offenses.8 9 Pursuant to section
1540(e)(4)(A), violators also may forfeit all specimens of endan-
(E) the International Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of
the North Pacific Ocean;
(F) the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species
of Wild Fauna and Flora; and
(G) other international agreements.
1-d. § 1531(a)(4).
181 See id. § 1531(a)(4)-(5), (b).
182 See id. S 1531(a)(3).
183 See id. § 1531(a)(5).
184 See discussion infra section 5 (regarding the extent to which the
provisions of the ESA are compatible with the sustainable use of endangered
species).
185 See 16 U.S.C. S 1537(a).
1"6 See id.; see also Kosloff & Trexler, supra note 176, at 346 (noting that the
Wildlife Permit Office of the FWS actually carries out the Management
Authority and the Scientific Authority functions).
187 See 16 U.S.C. S 1538(c)(1).
188 See id. 1540(a)(1), (b)(1).
189 See id. 1540 (b)(1).
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gered species to the United States."9 Additionally, the ESA may
require violators to surrender personal property such as guns,
traps, nets, and means of transportation, including vessels,
vehicles, and aircraft, in the case of convictions for criminal viola-
tions.191
4.4. Limitations and Enforcement Problems Under the ESA
The chief limitation of the ESA is the inadequate staffing of
the FWS, which prevents it from conducting inspections on many
shipments of wildlife. 92 In the southwestern United States, for
example, only one federal wildlife inspector is based in Laredo,
Texas and San Diego, California, both busy ports of entry.
Furthermore, only one wildlife agent in McAllen, Texas oversees
1,100 miles of border between the Gulf of Mexico and El Paso,
Texas.193
ESA regulations allow customs agents to clear wildlife
shipments when a FWS agent fails to appear for inspection
"within a reasonable time," 94 a term that the ESA and U.S.
courts have not defined, thus creating additional difficulties.1 9
In addition, FWS agents and customs officials are not required to
refuse clearance of wildlife shipments under the ESA, even if there
is reason to believe that the shipment is illegal under CITES.1 96
Because the ESA implements CITES, it also is subject to all of the
Convention's inherent limitations, including its many excep-
tions 97  Moreover, the ESA provides some offenders with
possible exemption from the ESA's provisions when enforcement
190 See id. § 1540(e)(4)(A).
191 See id. S 1540(e)(4)(B).
192 See, e.g., Alagappan, supra note 69, at 550.
193 See Maria Cone, NAFTA Imperils Border Wildlife, Officials Warn, L.A.
TIMES, Sept. 28, 1993, at A3, A16. A recent report by the FWS stated that it
needs 99 new employees and an additional $11.4 million in four border states
to grapple with the increased needs prompted by the passage of NAFTA. See
id. The U.S. government, however, allocated only an additional $100,000 to
the FWS' 1994 budget. See id.
194 50 C.F.R. § 14.54(a) (1993).
195 See id. S 14.54; Alagappan, supra note 69, at 551.
196 See 50 C.F.R. § 14.53; see also Alagappan, supra note 69, at 551 nn.64-65
(recommending that service officers be required to refuse clearance to all
shipments until they ascertain their legality).
197 See discussion supra section 2.4.
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would cause "undue economic hardship" to the violator.9 ' In
spite of the strict penalties designated by the ESA, U.S. courts
have been reluctant to impose such penalties, especially when
violations are deemed "innocent" conduct.'99 Given the many
difficulties of enforcing CITES, even where all necessary legisla-
tion exists, as in the United States, alternative strategies to
strengthen CITES, such as sustainable use, should be considered.
5. To WHAT EXTENT CAN SUSTAINABLE USE BE SUPPORTED
UNDER CITES?
While the two conflicting environmental philosophies of
preservationism and conservationism underlie CITES, sustainable
use is consonant with the conservationist philosophy.20° CITES'
prohibition on commercial trade in Appendix I species, however,
clearly derives from preservationist rather than conservationist
principles.2"' Western nations created and funded many expen-
sive protection programs, such as those in Kenya and Zimbabwe,
through a preservationist interpretation of CITES. 2 The
tension between CITES' conservationist and preservationist
rationales has led some parties to interpret the Convention as
incompatible with sustainable use.2 3 Additionally, the diver-
gence in interpretations has prompted the heated debates over
sustainable use at recent COPs.2°4
While some members have interpreted CITES differently in
the past, the Convention is not inherently hostile to the sustain-
able use of endangered species. 5 The Convention's preamble
notes that "peoples and [member states] are and should be the best
198 See 16 U.S.C. § 1539(b).
199 See, e.g., Alagappan, supra note 69, at 554-67 (giving multiple examples
of weak administrative enforcement and lenient judicial review under CITES
and the ESA); see also Kosloff & Trexler, supra note 176, at 354 (noting the
judicial reluctance to impose penalties under the ESA and other related judicial
problems).
200 See discussion supra section 3.2.
201 See CITES, supra note 2, 27 U.S.T. at 1093, 993 U.N.T.S. at 246. See
also supra section 3.2 for a discussion of preservationism and conservationism.
202 See supra notes 119-21 and accompanying text.
203 See generally Favre, Debate, supra note 22, at 882-86.
204 See discussion supra sections 1 & 3.1 (introducing advocacy of sustainable
use programs).
20' See Favre, Debate, supra note 22, at 886 (stating that the language of
CITES "accommodates the practice of sustainable use").
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protectors of their own wild fauna and flora,"' 6 thus providing
an important justification for permitting sustainable use programs
under CITES. The Convention also defines sustainable uses of
endangered species as those that are "not detrimental to the
survival of the species involved." °' CITES currently permits
the "non-detrimental" commercial use of Appendix II species, 28
but it does not allow the sustainable use of all endangered species
and has no provisions directed at implementing or encouraging
the implementation of sustainable use programs.2"
Like CITES, the ESA does not mention directly the term
"sustainable use." Several portions of the ESA, however, indicate
that its purpose is consistent with the goal of sustainable use.
First, its findings emphasize that "development untempered by
adequate concern and conservation" 2 0 has resulted in the extinc-
tion of species and further state that Congress encourages U.S.
states and other parties to develop and maintain conservation
programs. Second, the ESA articulates that one of its purpos-
es is to provide a program for the conservation of endangered and
threatened species. 2  Significantly, the ESA defines very broad-
ly the terms "conserve," "conserving," and "conservation":
[These terms] mean to use and the use of all methods and
procedures which are necessary to bring any endangered
species or threatened species to the point at which the
measures provided pursuant to this chapter are no longer
necessary. Such methods and procedures include, but are
not limited to, all activities associated with scientific
resources management such as research, census, law
enforcement, habitat acquisition and maintenance, propaga-
tion, live trapping, and transplantation, and, in the
206 CITES, supra note 2, 27 U.S.T. at 1090, 993 U.N.T.S. at 245.
20 Id. at 1093, 993 U.N.T.S. at 246.
208 See id. at 1095, 993 U.N.T.S. at 247; CITES SOURCEBOOK, supra note
10, at 4.
209 See, e.g., Favre, Debate, supra note 22, at 886 (stating that although
"CITES is not silent on the issue of sustainable use[,] ... that term is not
used").
210 16 U.S.C. S 1531(a)(1) (1988).
211 See id. S 1531(a)(5).
212 See id. S 1531(b).
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extraordinary case where population pressures within a
given ecosystem cannot be otherwise relieved, may include
regulated taking."'
This expansive definition, permitting the use of all necessary
methods for protecting and restoring endangered species, can be
understood to include unlisted methods such as sustainable use
programs. For certain domestic species, regulations adopted
pursuant to the ESA currently provide guidelines for the sustain-
able harvest and export of wild and captive-bred animals.214 For
these reasons, no impediments to the adoption of sustainable use
programs are found either in the ESA or in CITES itself.
6. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE U.S. POSITION ON
SUSTAINABLE USE
Several issues thus have been answered: (1) why the U.S.
position on sustainable use matters;21 (2) why CITES should be
selected as the appropriate forum for implementing U.S. policies
on sustainable use;2 16 and (3) why the United States should
consider supporting the sustainable use of endangered species
under CITES.217 Why the U.S. decision is a crucial one still
remains unanswered.
Stated simply, the U.S. position on sustainable use matters
because of the prominent role the United States plays in
CITES.21" As the largest single source of CITES' funding,
219
and the world's leading consumer of internationally traded
wildlife goods, 220 the United States potentially can exercise
considerable influence over the implementation of CITES. As the
world's largest consumer of all natural resources, the United States
has a responsibility to exercise leadership in supporting sound
213 Id. S 1532(3).
214 See, e.., 50 C.F.R. § 23.57 (1993) (establishing limitations on the export
of the U.S. alligator).
215 See supra notes 24-30 and accompanying text.
216 See discussion supra sections 2 & 3.
217 See discussion supra sections 4 & 5.
211 See supra note 24.
219 See Financing, supra note 24, at 29, Conf. 9.2.
22 See Jeff Barnard, Beauty Threatens Survival of Many Species, L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 1, 1995, at B1.
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environmental policies.22' The United States also can bring
about significant changes in international relations by adopting a
specific position on the issue, since its decision will affect North-
South tensions under CITES.m
CITES is the appropriate forum for implementing a policy for
the sustainable use of endangered species. First, CITES provides
an existing, well-known, and popular framework within which
nations may address issues involving endangered species.2
Second, it is the only global environmental treaty narrowly
tailored to address the issue of trade in endangered species.'
Third, CITES' regularly scheduled COPsm allow for ongoing
consultation among Convention members, giving them the
flexibility needed to adapt to unforeseen future developments. 6
Fourth, CITES is an excellent forum in which to address North-
South tensions, because of the great number of member states
representing both sides. Finally, implementing new policies under
CITES probably would require less monetary outlay than would
implementing similar programs under a new convention, because
at least a portion of the necessary structure is already in place.
Given the potential for various difficulties in implementing
sustainable use programs, the United States should strongly
advocate a CITES-based program meeting a number of stringent
preconditions. The United States could demonstrate its political
support for such a program with the promise of providing special
funding, in the form of renewable start-up and maintenance funds
for sustainable use projects, to be made available through the
CITES Secretariat.m The United States also could encourage
other member nations to provide similar support.
Under a U.S.-sponsored program, the CITES Secretariat should
221 See CHOOSING A SUSTAiNABLE FUTURE, supra note 25, at xii.
See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
While CITES has been in force for over 20 years, a constantly
expanding group of nations has ratified the Convention. See CITES
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 10, at 119-22 (listing CITES members and their dates
of accession); see also supra note 2 (giving the date for CITES' implementation).
224 See SUSSKIND, supra note 85, at 152-75.
1 See supra note 23 (stating the frequency with which COPs are held).
226 See GARETH PORTER & JANET W. BROWN, GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL
POLITICS 145-46 (1991).
227 Fo r example, under the ESA the United States already provides funding
for technical and training assistance to foreign governments. See Trexer &
Kosloff, supra note 134, at 117.
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serve as the oversight agency, processing all requests for aid and
receiving and analyzing all reported data. This requirement has
the added advantage of providing much-needed data on endangered
species populations for the use of the CITES Secretariat."
Perhaps the most important feature of the program would be
placing the burden of proof on those countries seeking to
implement or to benefit from sustainable use projects, thus
requiring them to provide data sufficient to demonstrate that such
uses would be sustainable.29 The requirement for reporting this
data should continue for the duration of the project to ascertain
its proper functioning, and to determine the maintenance or
increase in population levels for the species involved.
Under this system, countries whose Scientific Authorities were
unable to meet these data requirements could request financial and
technical assistance and temporary staff members from the CITES
Secretariat, or from any other CITES member." As parties
worked together, greater cooperation among CITES parties might
result, perhaps lessening North-South tensions. By increasing the
level of expertise among Scientific Authorities in range countries,
the program would enhance enforcement under CITES generally,
and could affect oversight of those domestic sustainable use
projects not under CITES' jurisdiction.
In return for its support of sustainable use projects, the United
States should require strict compliance with the terms of the
Convention from all parties wishing to benefit from such projects.
This should include, for example, the requirement that parties
enact the legislation necessary to implement CITES,231 and that
they have no current reservations to the Convention.3 2
Under the CITES program, some small percentage of the
228 See discussion supra section 3.5.6.
2 See supra note 170 and accompanying text. Under this plan, consumer
nations and range countries thus would have a greater incentive or cooperating
in data collection, since any sustainable use program permitted would benefit
both groups. See discussion supra section 3.5.6. The data collected could
inclue inormation about existing population levels, rates of reproduction, a
predicted sustainable use rate under the program, the amount of habitat needed
per individual, the rate of habitat loss or deterioration, and any other
information contributing to a greater understanding of the species and its needs.
See id.
230 See supra notes 171-72 and accompanying text.
23 See supra note 24.
232 See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
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proceeds from each sustainable use project, perhaps one to three
percent, should be directed to support the CITES Secretariat in its
efforts to assist CITES implementing agencies. The United States
might require that a larger percentage of its aid, perhaps twenty-
five percent, be directed to education. This aid could be used to
introduce the idea of sustainable use projects to those residents of
range states most likely to benefit from them, and to emphasize
the potential of receiving income from nonconsumptive uses of
endangered species, including tourism.
The United States should recommend strongly one significant
safeguard for all sustainable use projects: requiring the application
for periodic reauthorization at two-year intervals for all projects
under CITES' jurisdiction. This would allow for the imposition
of certain additional requirements as needed. Requirements for
reauthorization might include a showing that local residents were
sharing in the profits from a sustainable use program and that
they had a significant role in its implementation,"' or that
breeders returned a certain percentage of each generation raised in
a farming or ranching operation to the wild. T4 This type of
oversight should create significant incremental progress in
numerous problematic areas.
7. CONCLUSION
As the White House reviews the President's Council on
Sustainable Development's recommendations for U.S. domestic
sustainable development policies, 35 the United States should
turn its attention to the question of sustainable use under CITES.
Sustainable use does not conflict inherently with the purposes of
either CITES or the ESA. A carefully designed, CITES-adminis-
tered sustainable use program should be of great interest to the
United States and other CITES members, for its potential to
improve the working of the Convention, to involve local people
in range states in protecting endangered species, and to improve
cooperation among developed and developing nations.
The implementation of a sustainable use program under
CITES is not without its limitations. With support from the
23' See supra notes 97-102 and accompanying text (describing Pormpuraaw
tribe efforts to breed and sell skins from endangered saltwater crocodiles).
2 See supra notes 109-11 and accompanying text.
" See supra note 25.
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United States and all other CITES members, however, sustainable
use projects could improve significantly the survival chances of
endangered species in many countries, as well as raise the standard
of living for those people most likely to exploit them illegally. 6
Furthermore, as one African scholar reminded conservationists,
the international community has a choice of either allowing
limited trade or letting it go uncontrolled and illegal. In this
scholar's words, "'We are all users of wildlife . . . . It's not an
issue of whether [there] will be use or non-use. The real issue is
whether that use can be sustainable or [whether] we abandon that
[policy] and let it become unsustainable."' 23
236 See discussion supra section 3.4.
21 See Cone, Conflict, supra note 13, at A27.
" Id. (quoting Professor Marshall Murphree of the University of
Zimbabwe).
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